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This paper evaluates 'new economic geography' theory by comparing it with a 
competing non-nested model derived from urban economics. Using bootstrap 
inference and the J-test, the paper shows that while NEG theory is supported by the 
data, it needs to be modified to achieve this, and it is not the only, or even the best or 




Interest in economic geography has been stimulated by the introduction of a formal 
general equilibrium 'new economic geography' (NEG) theory in which increasing 
returns to scale are an outcome of each agent solving a clearly defined economic 
problem within the context of a monopolistic competition market structure (Dixit and 
Stiglitz, 1977). Recents books, notably  Fujita,  Krugman, and Venables (1999) and  
Brakman, Garretsen, and van Marrewijk(2001), have help to popularise these 
developments in geographical economics, and despite some cautious reactions 
(Neary, 2001), on the whole NEG theorizing has been reasonably widely appreciated 
among the broader  economics and regional science community, helping to establish 
at a formal level the role of increasing returns, which had long been seen as a key to 
understanding the spatial concentration of economic activity. Initially, theoretical 
developments were at the cutting edge of research activity, but more recently we have 
seen a growing literature aimed at operationalising and testing NEG (see for example 
Combes and Lafourcade, 2001, 2004, Combes and Overman, 2003, Forslid et. al.  
2002, Head  and  Mayer, 2003, Redding  and  Venables, 2004, Rice and  Venables,  
2003). Among this literature is analysis relating to the so-called wage equation, which 
links nominal wages to market access or potential
1, and which was initially studied by 
Hanson(1997,1998) and more latterly by Roos(2001), Brakman et. al. (2002), 
Mion(2003) and Niebuhr(2004) and  Niebuhr(2004). The present paper also follows 
this strand of analysis.   
 
This recent rigorous empirical work has raised some questions about the 
operationalization, scope and relevance of NEG theory, and in this heightened wave 
of constructive criticism, I follow Davis and Weinstein (2003) and Head and 
Ries(2001) by going beyond NEG model fitting, calibration and parameter estimation 
to examine the success of NEG in the face of a competing explanation. Although 
Leamer and Levinsohn’s (1994) advice is to  ‘estimate don’t test’, it is this kind of 
direct confrontation that is seen as the acid test of whether a theory can be accepted as 
the superior explanation of empirical reality.  In this spirit, the present paper, building 
                                                 
1 Harris(1954) was the first to use a variant of  the market potential concept.  3
on the work in Fingleton(2003, 2004), confronts NEG with an alternative (simpler) 
model derived largely from the literature of urban economics (what is referred to as 
the UE model), to see which of the two provides a better explanation of variations in 
nominal wage rates across 200 EU regions.  
 
One issue of particular importance here is the fact that the two competing hypotheses 
are non-nested, meaning that one is not simply a restricted version of the other, 
comprising a subset of its the explanatory variables. There is a wide literature on the 
most appropriate way to test non-nested hypotheses, which is not straightforward, and 
in this paper I make extensive use of bootstrapping the J-test (following Davidson and 




To summarise, in Section 2 of the paper I briefly set out the basis of the relevant 
theoretical relationship coming from NEG theory, namely the wage equation linking 
nominal wages to market potential. Section 3 is concerned with an outline of the 
competing UE hypothesis. In Section 4, additional covariates are introduced as a 
necessary requirement for unbiased estimation, and in Section 5, estimation methods 
are considered and the main empirical results of the confrontation between NEG and 
UE  are presented.  Section 6 concludes. The Appendix gives supplementary results 




2. The NEG model 
 
The wage equation (1) derives from the system of simultaneous equations given by 
Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999), linking nominal wages (
M
i w ) in the 
monopolistically competitive sector M to market access ( Pi), where i denotes region.  
Note that this is a short-run equilibrium relationship based on an assumption that the 
migration response (say) to real wage differences is slow compared with the 
instantaneous entry and exit of firms in the M sector (usually taken to be industry) so  4
that profits are immediately driven to zero. It is only in the very long-run that we 
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Equation (2) shows that P for region i depends on income levels ( r Y  ),  M prices (
M
r G ) 
and transport costs from region i to r ( ir T ), where  σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution 
of M varieties, summing across all regions including i. The competitive sector C 
(normally characterised as 'agriculture') consists of goods that are freely transported 
and produced under constant returns, so that C wages 
C
i w are constant across regions. 
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 in which  ir D is the straight-line distance between regions i and r. Since some of the 
regions are quite large, it is infeasible to assume that internal distances are zero. The 
problem of internal distance estimation was first considered by Stewart(1947), whose 









which areai is area i’s area in square miles. I assume that  0.1 τ = , so as to avoid large 
values in the exponentiation. The use of natural logarithm of distance rather than 
distance per se implies a power function, since 
ln ln (e )
ir ir DD
ir eD
τβ τ βτ β ==.   
 
The M price index Gi is given by  
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in which the number of varieties produced in region r is represented by 
r λ , which is 
equal to the share in region r of the total supply of M workers. 
 
Income in region r is  
  (1 ) rr
M C
rr r Yw w θλ θ φ =+ −  (5) 
                                         
 In order to estimate equation (3), I use the share of   C workers in each region ( ) i φ , 
and the share of M workers (
r λ ), and the expenditure share of M goods (θ ) is taken 
as the overall share of total employment in 2000 that is engaged in M activities, 
assuming also that θ  is also the total M workers and 1-θ  is the total C workers using 
a suitable metric that equates the overall number of workers to 1.  
 
 
Rather than the conventional definition
2, in this paper the M sector is identified with 
the Market Services, with all other activities assumed to be competitive (C), since it 
seems reasonable to characterise the sector as a set of small firms operating under 
monopolistic competition, producing differentiated varieties under internal increasing 
returns to scale. This choice is also based on the precedence set in the earlier UE 
literature (Rivera-Batiz, 1988, Abdel-Rahman  and  Fujita, 1990).  The assumption is 
that with free entry and exit to the sector and profits continually being driven to zero, 
there are numerous start-ups so that fixed start up costs are a prominent part of many 
firms' costs structure, and their small equilibrium size means that internal economies 
do not become negligible. For example, assume that typical firm t has a single input,  
labour (L) ,  so that its total cost function is  () L sa m t =+ in which the fixed labour 
requirement is s and the marginal labour requirement a , and the equilibrium output is  
() mt . Although as  () mt  increases, returns to scale (defined as average cost divided 
by marginal cost) fall asymptotically to 1, typically  () mt  is small. Hence it seems 
reasonable to choose a 'sector' typified by small firms using labour as a predominant 
input, firms freely entering and leaving the market, and competitive pressure giving a 
zero profit equilibrium. Additionally,  it turns out (see Table 1 notes) that identifying 
                                                 
2 Manufacturing is assumed to have increasing returns to scale in many theoretical and applied papers, 
for example Forslid et. al. (2002) use evidence from the presence of scale economies in different 
industrial sectors provided by Pratten (1988).    6
the M  sector with industry does not alter our conclusion regarding the relative 
explanatory power of our two competing hypotheses.  
 
  
Defining the M sector enables us to obtain quantities for  i φ , 
r λ  and θ  , but in order 
to calculate equation (1) it is also necessary to have data on wage rates 
M
i w in the M 
sector and wages  
C w  for the C sector. Unfortunately these data are not available, and 
I have therefore used the overall wage level (
o
i w ) as a proxy for 
M
i w . The basis of the 
empirical analysis is therefore annual compensation by NUTS 2 region, data which 
are produced by Cambridge Econometrics(CE) using the EUROSTAT REGIO 
database and EUROSTAT national accounts.  In the theory, C wages do not vary with 
region, and I approximate them by assuming that  ()
Co
r wM E A N w = . Allowance is 
made subsequently for the measurement errors these assumptions introduce into our 
analysis.  
 
For the UK part of the EU compensation data, I use  a more credible source of 
compensation data, namely the New Earnings Survey(NES)
3 giving regional weekly 
wage rates in pounds sterling. This follows from the fact that the compensation in 
euros provided in the CE database is an exact linear function of total GVA per 
worker, so I prefer to replace this by the direct survey data of the NES.  Compatibility 
with the other EU regions was achieved by multiplying each region's NES wage rate 
by the ratio of overall UK annual euro compensation per employee to the UK overall 
weekly wage rate
4.  The resulting euros wage data for UK regions gives a total UK 
wage bill which is exactly equal to the total in the CE database. In fact using the entire 
CE compensation dataset has a negligible effect on the results obtained.  In exactly 
the same way, the German compensation data for NUTS 2 regions is obtained by 
scaling the NUTS 1 region wage by the ratio of the output per worker in the NUTS 1 
and NUTS 2 regions. 
 
                                                 
3 This is an annual employer-based survey carried out by the Office of National Statistics.  The data are 
gross weekly pay for male and female full time workers irrespective of occupation, and are available on 
the NOMIS website (the Office for National Statistics’ on-line labour market statistics database).   
4 Equal to pounds per week times employment for each region to give the overall UK wage bill, then 
divided by total UK employment.  7
 
3. THE UE model 
 
The UE model is the same as that set out in Fingleton (2003), following Rivera-Batiz, 
(1988), Abdel-Rahman  and  Fujita, (1990) and Ciccone and Hall(1996), so in order to 
save space I simply sketch its main features here.  The model again divides the 
economy into an M and a C sector, with the same characteristics as outlined above, 
and under the model the M sector provides inputs to C's production which have the 
effect that internal scale  economies in the M sector translate into  external economies 
to the C sector that are increasing in the density of economic activity. This then leads 
to a reduced form with wages as a function of the density of employment in the area, 
and thus in this way we have a competing (UE) hypothesis for regional wage 
variation.  
 
To see this in a little more detail, assume that the production technology for 
the C sector is a Cobb-Douglas production function  
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in which L is land, E(C) is the level of C labour units, E = E(C ) +E(M), and I is the 
level of composite services (I) derived from the M sector, determined by a CES sub-
production function under monopolistic competition. Production is per unit of land, 
hence  L = 1, and from this it is possible to show (Fujita and Thisse, 2002, p 102) that 
the level of C production is defined by the total number of labour units E (in both C 
and M sectors), in this case  per unit area, thus 
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in which φ  is a function of other constants and γ  is the elasticity where 
 
  [1 (1 )( 1)] γ α βµ =+ − −  (8) 
           8
The UE model therefore capture increasing returns to the density of activity given by 
E, reflecting the increased variety of M services, so long as γ  > 1 . Equation (6) 
shows that whether or not we see increasing returns depends on services being 
sufficiently important to final production, which is indexed by the magnitude ofβ  < 
1, and on the amount of internal scale economies to producer services (µ  > 1). It also 
depends on congestion effects (1-α   < 1) being sufficiently small so as not to 
overcome the other two factors (Ciccone and Hall, 1996).  
 
The direct comparability of the UE and NEG models depends on both acting 
as competing explanations for nominal wage rates. For the UE model, the wage rate is 
the outcome of assuming an equilibrium allocation of production factors so that the 
coefficient α  is equal to the share of Q that goes to E  (rather than the other factor L), 
in other words using standard equilibrium theory and equating the wage rate to the 
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Substituting into equation (7), we obtain   
   
  ln( ) ln( ) ( 1)ln( ) wE α φγ =+ −  (10) 
 
It is apparent that the UE hypothesis makes no reference to market potential, which 
depends on transport costs, transport cost mediated price index variations and income 
variations across regions. The position of a region in relation to other regions is of no 
consequence, and it is the internal conditions within each region, which are important. 
Both theories depend on Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition theory, but the M 
variety elasticity of substitution  (1 ) σµ µ =−  only enters the UE reduced form (10) 
via the 'returns to scale' parameter γ , in contrast in NEG  σ appears in various ways. 
It is both the coefficient on P in the reduced form (1), and it also determines P , 
crucially controlling the magnitude of distance cost effects via  
1
ir T
σ − . 
 
4. The extended model specifications    
 
  9
In modelling the wage data, under NEG theory market access (P) is the principal 
explanatory variable, but there are also other ancillary effects that also need to be 
taken account of in order to allow unbiased estimation. Similarly, under UE theory the 
wage rates depends primarily on the density of employment (E), but will in practice 
depend also on other factors. I assume that for both hypotheses one of the principal 
causes of wage rate differences between regions is regional variation in labour 
efficiency, which is assumed to depend on schooling (S) and on technical skills (T) 
acquired at the place of work. In the analysis below I therefore include the  variables S 
and T  to capture efficiency variations across the EU regions.  
 
 
The schooling variable S is the share of the population aged 25-59 with a high level of 
educational attainment in 1999, as provided for EU NUTS 2 regions by Eurostat's 
Labour Force Survey.  The technical skill variable T is represented by the 
International Patent Classification patents per capita (averaged over 1985-1995) by 
EU NUTS 2 region that is available from REGIO, which broadly reflects regional 
variations in  R&D activity and therefore workers with computing and information 
technology skills. Full technical details of data availability, definitions and 
methodologies are given in the Regions: Statistical Yearbook published by Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities.  First I discuss in more detail 
what these variables imply by comparing them with supplementary data available for 
the UK. 
 
Pan-European educational attainment measures are undoubtedly subject to variations 
due to varying national standards. Moreover there may be doubt that the labour force 
survey data measures educational attainment with sufficient accuracy. In fact we get a 
good indication of the quality of the data used by comparing it with UK census data 
on the proportion of the population (aged 18 and over) with no educational 
qualifications
5. The (Pearson product moment) correlation between the 1991 NUTS 2 
                                                 
5 Unfortunately at the time of writing we only have access to the 1991 census data at the NUTS 2 level, 
which is a 10% sample provided by the NOMIS database. In order to justify our correlation of S  with 
1991 UK census data, we observe that at a different level of spatial resolution the 1991 and 2001 
censuses give essentially the 'same' distribution.  Comparing the 1991 and 2001shares with no 
qualifications for the 408 unitary authority and local authority districts in Great Britain, we find that 
while the average population share with no qualifications has fallen dramatically, there exists a strong 
linear correlation  (r = 0.872) between the 1991 and 2001 census data sets.  10
census data on the shares with no qualifications and the NUTS 2 level pan-European 
labour force survey data indicator (S) is equal to  -0.948.  
 
Similarly, our interpretation of IPC patents per capita as a proxy for  T is supported by 
a fairly strong correlation (r = 0.654) at the UK NUTS 2 level with the location 
quotient based on data from the year 2000 annual business enquiry employee analysis 
for the two digit sectors 72 (computing and related activities) and 73 (research and 
development).  The assumption is that the workers in these sectors have a high level 
of computing and related skills which enhances their efficiency.   
 
I also assume that there are various national-level factors relating to differences 
between countries in labour efficiency, which I capture by country-specific dummy 
variables. However these dummy variable undoubtedly also represent the net effect of 
various other country-specific effects, such as any remaining differences employment 
law and minimum wages, working hours regulations and exchange rates, and so on, so 
that the national dummies are in effect catch-all variables helping to account for a 
large portion of the variance in wage rates and hopefully ruling out misspecification 
bias due to omitted variables. The final specifications are therefore 
 
 H1:NEG  01 2 3 ln ln
o w b b P b S bT dummies ξ =+ + + + +  (11) 
 H2:UE  01 2 3 ln ln
o w c c E c S c T dummies =+ + + + + Ψ  (12) 
 
There are other wage equation specifications that these can be related to. For instance, 
analysing data for smaller areal units than the NUTS 2 regions used here, one may 
wish to explicitly include the effects of commuting in the model, as in 
Fingleton(2003,2004), allowing the level of worker efficiency in an area to depend on 
workers resident outside the local area. More generally, a wage equation falls out 
from the version of NEG theory developed by Helpman(1998) and  Hanson(1998). 
While this has essentially the same micro-foundations as Fujita et. al.(1999), a non-
tradable consumption good (housing services) replaces the perfectly traded 
competitive sector (or  ‘agriculture’ in Fujita et. al., 1999). Brakman, Garretsen and 
Schramm(2004) develop this approach, creating reduced forms quite similar to 
equation (11), including district specific control variables (dummies)  comparable to  11
the variables S, T and the dummy variables used here. With regard to equation (12), 
similar specifications are the outcome of adding variables equivalent in effect to  S, T 
and the dummy variables to the basic UE specification linking wage rates with 
employment density.  Combes et. al. (2004) for example exploit a large database to 
control for worker skill differences, emphasising the effect of endogenous interactions 
(skilled workers attracted to high wages and well as high wages dependent on skilled 
workers)  and the role of amenity difference between areas.  
 
Clearly there are other variables that could be introduced to sharpen the models or 
replace the variables actually used. For instance Neibuhr(2004) uses  the share of total 
population with qualifications or work experience in science and technology 
occupations, and also introduces variables such as  local amenities (climate etc),  
sectoral composition (GVA shares in markets services, etc)  and border effects. 
However in a cross-sectional model, if these were significant causes of spatial 
variation, their omission would show up as significant residual autocorrelation since 
the dependent variable is itself significant spatially autocorrelated (Moran's  I = 
0.7508, with standardised values = 13.80, using equation 10). It turns out (see the 
empirical analysis below) that the simple specification adopted leaves no significant 
residual autocorrelation, so there does not appear to be any significant omitted 
variable. It appears as though any remaining unexplained variation can be treated as 
stochastic error, as represented by spherical disturbances  , ξ Ψ  with variances Ω
2 and  
Φ
2 respectively.   
 
  It might also be argued that technological externalities have been omitted 
from the discussion thus far, with the exception of the inclusion of congestion effects 
in the UE model. There is a growing body of evidence that other un-priced factors 
will also affect productivity and wage rates, notably as a result of spillover effects 
relating to knowledge and its enhanced rate of generation and transmission (see for 
example Audretsch and Feldman, 1996, and Breschi and Lissoni, 2001). The essential 
idea here is that firms investing in knowledge production will be unable to completely 
capture the benefits of their investment, which will spill over as an external 
economies to other firms employing skill-enhanced job-migrants. I therefore assume 
that the presence of a high proportion of workers who are associated with research  12
and development, knowledge generation and production and transmission, as 
represented by the variables S and T, will be associated with additional externalities 
which boost labour efficiency levels and wage rates, capturing in an indirect way the 
more elusive technological externalities associated with knowledge flows. These 
spillovers are likely to be primarily confined within local labour market areas within 
the EU, since job-migration is much easier than household migration, for various 
cultural and economic reasons. The NUTS 2 regions are essentially formal 
(administrative) regions rather than functional regions, and although it is possible that 
such spillovers will cross regional boundaries so that efficiency levels and hence wage 
rates in neighbouring regions may tend to be correlated, our tests for residual spatial 
autocorrelation do not detect them, probably because of they are absorbed by the 
country dummy effects.  
 
 
5. Estimation methods and results   
 
The initial results in this section show that the NEG model, augmented by labour 
efficiency variables and catch-all dummies, accounts for a very large proportion of 
wage variation across the EU NUTS 2 regions. Table 1 summarises the results of 
fitting equation (11) by 2sls, using the assumed value σ = 6.25 to construct Pi. The 
value assumed is at the mid-point of the  range of empirical estimates given by Head 
and Mayer(2003). Similarly Head and Ries(2001) and Feenstra(1994) suggest a range 
from about 4 to 9.  
 
I use 2sls because of the endogeneity and measurement error embodied within 
the market potential measure P, which itself depends on the 
o w .  The issue of 
endogeneity has been given careful consideration by Mion(2004), who reviews the 
adoption by Hanson(1998)  of higher levels of spatial aggregation (US States rather 
than counties)  of the right hand side endogenous variables to break the link between 
the county-level right hand side variables and the disturbances. However Mion(2004) 
argues that this entails an information loss and does not guarantee exogeneity. To 
overcome endogeneity, Mion(2004) exploits the time dimension, assuming that 
dynamics occur because of sluggish adjustment to equilibrium rather than fully  13
contemporaneous simultaneity, and picks up spatial dependence via and endogenous 
and exogenous spatial lags such as Wx, where W is the n by n matrix with cell (i,j) 
equal to the reciprocal of distance between regions i and j, post-multiplied by (say) 
the n by 1 vector x. In the spatial econometrics literature, one typically sees similar  
(cross-sectional) spatial lag models written as 
1 ln( ) ln( ) ( ) ( )
oo wW w X b I W X b ρ υ ρ υ
− =+ + = −+, in which X is the n by k matrix 
comprising the unit vector and k-1  regressors and b is a k by 1 vector of parameters, 
ρ  is a scalar parameter and ν is a vector of well-behaved disturbances. In this case 
the inversion requires a non-singular matrix, but I W ρ − becomes singular  for 
instance at the pointsρ  = 1/emax and ρ  = 1/emin , where emax  and emin  are  the largest 
positive and negative eigenvalues of W.  The situation here is fairly similar to the 
existence of unit roots in time series (Fingleton, 1999), so that ρ  estimates outside 
the stable envelope 1/emin <ρ  < 1/emax  can result in a potentially ‘explosive’ or non-
convergent model with unknown properties. While maximum likelihood estimation 
(using the correct likelihood function) restrains ρ  to within the stable range, this is 
not guaranteed by other estimation methods. It is therefore questionable whether the 
estimation carried out by Mion(2004) is appropriate.  
 
In this paper I assume full adjustment to short-run equilibrium and approach the issue 
of endogeneity from a non-dynamic perspective, relying on the presence of exogenous 
covariates S, T and the country dummies. The assumption that  S and T are exogenous 
contrasts with  Redding and Scott's (2003) model of  endogenous interaction of 
schooling (human capital formation) and wages, which proposes that workers upgrade 
from unskilled to skilled by considering the benefits of this transition, in terms of 
additional wage rates, in relation to the cost of acquiring additional skills. However in 
the present context it seems reasonable to assume exogeneity. Not only does the S and 
T data pre-date the wages data, and therefore cannot be determined by current wage 
rates, but they are also undoubtedly affected by factors other than wage differentials, 
such as Government and EU policy initiatives, institutions  and social and cultural 
differences
6. 
                                                 
6  Redding and Scott (2003) acknowledge the importance of institutions and policies for economic 
development by also formalising the indirect effects of less tangible influences operating through  
agricultural intensity, industry production costs and education costs. For instance the equilibrium  14
 
Additionally I utilize the so-called three group method which was initially introduced 
in the context of measurement error problems (see for instance Koutsoyiannis, 1977, 
Kennedy, 2003) but which usefully provides an extra instrument that is quite highly 
correlated with P and yet presumably remain uncorrelated with the errors. This is 
based on the rank order of P, with the instrument taking values –1,0,1 according to 
whether P is in the bottom third, middle, or upper third of its ranking.  
 
The first stage of 2sls involves regressing P, as defined by equation (2),  on S, T, WS, 
WT, I
NEG , WI
NEG , and the 14 country dummies. The exogenous spatial lags WS, WT 
and  WI
NEG  are the result of multiplying variable S, T and I
NEG  by the standardised 
contiguity matrix


























in which ← →  indicates that regions i and j are contiguous. In other words cell i of 
vector WS , for example, is the weighted average of S in regions that are contiguous to 
region i, with weights equal to the reciprocal of the number of regions contiguous to i.  
 
The second stage uses the fitted values of this first stage regression as the instrumental 
variable  for P, giving the results in Table 1.  
 
 
Table 1 near here 
 
                                                                                                                                            
supply of skilled workers is reduced by higher agricultural productivity, increased by lower production 
costs due perhaps to technology transfer, and increased by lower education costs.  
 
7 This matrix is also used throughout for the spatial autocorrelation tests.  15
Table 1 shows that the estimated value  ˆ σ  = 2.329 differs from the assumed mid-point 
value σ = 6.25 used to construct Pi . The approximate 99% confidence interval for  ˆ σ  
is 1.552 to 4.665, although this interval is rather narrow because of the very close fit 
of the model. Table 2 shows the outcome of re-estimating the NEG model with 
different assumed values for σ, indicating that it is only when σ reaches 
approximately 12 does the assumed value lie within the 99% confidence envelope. 
Although an elasticity of substitution of this magnitude is outside the range normally 
associated with NEG models, this range is mainly based on M defined as industry, and 
therefore very diverse varieties with, presumably comparatively low substitutability 
compared with market services. I find that assuming has σ = 12 produces a well-
fitting model with goodness-of-fit statistics (Table 3) similar to those obtained by 
assuming σ = 6.25. 
 
Table 2 near here 
Table 3 near here 
 
The competing model H2:UE given by equation(12)  is fitted in almost precisely the 
same way as the NEG model, with an instrumental variable for employment density 
(E) to allow for any endogeneity caused by employment levels depending on wage 
rates. I use the same set of instruments as for equation (11) but with  I
UE , WI
UE in 
place of  I
NEG , WI
NEG, having been calculated in the same way. Table 4 summarises  
the results, showing that H2:UE performs equally as well as H1:NEG in explaining 
the variation in wage rates, and although there is an indication of positive residual 
autocorrelation, it is not significant at conventional levels.  The coefficient estimate  
1 ˆ c  = 0.064766 means that  ˆ γ = 1.064766, implying increasing returns to scale with a 
1% increase in employment density associated with a 1.06% increase in the wage rate.  
 
Table 4 near here 
 
The two competing models of Tables 3 and 4 both account for almost the same 
proportion wage rates variance, and both show that the regressors S, T and either ln P 
or ln E are significant. However the hypotheses are non-nested, in other words the 
explanatory variables of one are not a subset of the explanatory variables of the other,  16
so it is not possible to simply test the models by restricting parameters. In general, 
with non-nested hypotheses, inferential methods used to test nested hypotheses 
becomes inappropriate ( Cox, 1961,1962, Pesaran, 1974, and Pesaran and Deaton, 
1978). In order to overcome this problem, I use the comparatively simple
8 Davidson 
and MacKinnon(1981,1982) J-test applied to 2sls estimation. This involves estimating 
the H2:UE model to obtain fitted values ln ˆ
o
UE w , which are then added as an auxiliary 
variable to the maintained H1:NEG model, giving equation (14). If the coefficient on 
the added variable is not significantly different from expectation under the maintained 
hypothesis, then we do not reject H1. However, the non-symmetry of the test means 
that rejecting H1 does not imply that H2 is true, and vice versa. It could turn out that 
both H1 and H2 are falsified. We also need to test the opposite case, first estimating 
H1:NEG to obtain the fitted values ln ˆ
o
NEG w   which then becomes an auxiliary variable 
under the  maintained H2:UE model, as in equation (15).  
  01 2 3 4ˆ ln ln ln
oo
UE w b b P b S bT b w dummies ξ =+ + + + + +  (14) 
 
  01 2 3 4ˆ ln ln ln
oo
NEG w c c E c S c T c w dummies =+ + + + + + Ψ  (15) 
One problem with this approach is that the reference distributions for the t-ratios on 
the auxiliary fitted variables ln ˆ
o
NEG w  and ln ˆ
o
UE w are unknown, and not simply N(0,1), 
which tends to over-reject the null.  Fan and Li(1995), Godfrey(1998), 
MacKinnon(2002c)  and Davidson and MacKinnon(2002a,b)  suggest the bootstrap J-
test to obtain a better measure of the true size of the J-test, and this has been suggested 
by Godfrey (1983) and  Pesaran and Weeks(1999) for non-nested linear regressions 
estimated
9 by 2sls. Taking H1:NEG as the maintained hypothesis, for example, I first 











=  (16) 
  
 
                                                 
8 There is an extensive literature dedicated to non-nested hypothesis tests, including the Mizon and 
Richards(1986)  encompassing test, although none are as straightforward as the J-test. 
9 Davidson and MacKinnon (2002a) show why bootstrapping the J-test almost always works well 
compared with the ordinary J-test, even when assumptions of normal errors and exogenous regressors 
do not hold.  17
and then refer this statistic to its reference distribution obtained by resampling the  
residuals
10 under the maintained hypothesis.  
 
Table 5 near here 
 
The estimates in Table 5 are the result of fitting equation (14), with σ = 12 and with 
ˆ ln
o
UE w  the outcome of  fitting equation (12) (as summarised by Table 4). For the 
reference distribution I randomly re-sample with replacement from the vector of 
residuals produced by the maintained hypothesis H1:NEG. To achieve this, 
commencing with the equation (11) estimates, I calculate the 2sls residual vector 
ˆ ˆ ln ln
oo ww ξ =− and resample this B
*  times to give  ˆ
B ξ  , where B = 1…B
* denotes the 
bootstrap sample number. From this I calculate, for B = 1… B
*,  ˆ ˆ ln
o
BB wA b ξ =+  ,  in 
which A is an n by k matrix with columns 1, lnP , S, T  and the 14 country dummies 
and  ˆ b  is the k by 1 vector of 2sls estimates given by Table 3, plus the coefficients for 
the country dummies. First the resulting vectors ln
o
B w  (B = 1…B
* ) are used as the 
dependent variable to estimate the UE model equation (12) by 2sls which provides 
fitted values  ˆ ln
o
B w . Second I obtain the set of B
*  t-ratios ( 1 ˆ J s) by introducing  ˆ ln
o
B w  
(in place of  ˆ ln
o
UE w ) as the  ancillary variable in equation (14), which is estimated by 
2sls. Note that for each of the B
*  samples, a completely new set of 2sls estimates are 
obtained, with the log market potential (ln iB P ) and its instrument  recalculated using 
ln
o
B w  (B = 1…B
* ). The B
*   1 ˆ J s are an appropriate reference distribution for testing 
the significance of the 
 t-ratio given as 5.834 in Table 5.  
 
Figure 1 shows the  ˆ J  reference distribution for B
*  = 999, which clearly illustrates 
how the N(0,1) distribution would lead to over-rejection of the maintained hypothesis. 
The reference distribution has mean equal to 2.107 and variance equal to 0.9123, 
                                                 
10 Davidson and MacKinnon(2002a) recommend scaling the residuals by multiplying by  () nnk − , 
but with n = 200 and k =  18, this amounts to 1.048, which has a negligible effect. 
 
  18
hence 5.834 would be an extreme occurrence under the maintained hypothesis. We 
therefore have quite strong evidence that H1:NEG should be rejected. 
 











=  (17) 
    While we have rejected H1 using H2, this does not imply that H2 is true, and it is        
Entirely possible that H2 could be rejected by H1, in which case neither NEG nor UE 
would be acceptable.  In order to test this proposition, I therefore treat H2:UE as the 
maintained hypothesis and look at the significance of  ˆ ln
o
NEG w  in equation (15), where 
ˆ ln
o
NEG w is the vector of fitted values given by equation (11).  The resulting estimates 
of equation (15) are in Table 6.  
The  2 ˆ J  reference distribution is obtained using the same method as for  1 ˆ J  but using 
the Table 4 estimates rather than Table 3. In this case  ˆ ˆ ln
o
BB wA b =+ Ψ , in which A is 
an n by k matrix with columns 1, lnE , S, T  and the 14 country dummies and  ˆ b  is the 
k by 1 vector of estimates given by Table 4. Hence the  vectors ln
o
B w  (B = 1…B
* ) 
lead to the  2 ˆ J  reference distribution, again with each  2 ˆ J  provided by 2sls estimation 
in which  P is re-calculated for each sample.  
 




The  2 ˆ J  reference distribution given in Figure 2 has a mean equal to 3.204  and 
variance equal to 0.9956, so the observed t-ratio of 4.298 is quite close to the expected 
value and with an upper tail probability of  0.14 could have been generated by 
randomly re-sampling the residuals from the maintained model.   19
 
Figure 2 near here 
The evidence I have presented suggests that of the two competing hypotheses, it is UE 
which stands up better when confronted with the competing hypothesis, and UE 
falsifies the (augmented) NEG model even though the latter fits the data extremely 
well. There is some other evidence (See Appendix) that suggests that the NEG model 
is also tenable, but this refers to NEG models with less plausible elasticities of 
substitution.  For example if we adopt the central value from the typically published 
range (σ = 6.25) then there is a significant difference between the estimated value 
(Table 1) and the assumed value, which places a question mark against the assumed 
value. Ignoring the difference between estimated and assumed σ and repeating the 
above analysis (see Appendix), does also confirm the main interpretation of the data  
presented here, that the UE model rejects the NEG model, although in this case there 
is some indication that the (questionable) NEG model also marginally rejects UE.      
In the appendix I also give results based on assuming σ = 20, which is atypical of the 
published estimates although it does produce not dissimilar estimated and assumed σ 
values. In this case, while the NEG model does not reject the UE model, thus 
supporting the main thesis of this paper, neither is the NEG model rejected by the UE 
model (see Appendix). This result however is consistent with our interpretation that 
UE dominates NEG as a hypothesis, since with  σ = 20,  market access (ln P) ,  is 
strongly linearly correlated with  employment density (ln E) (see Table 2),  so in this 





New economic geography theory has led to a considerable amount of recent work 
developing operational NEG models  that give weight to empirical as well as 
theoretical concordance. In this paper I show that an econometric model motivated by 
NEG theory accounts for a very large proportion of the variation in wage rates across 
200 NUTS 2 region of the EU. However, the main contribution of this paper is that it 
tests the validity and scope of NEG against a competing theory. Given two competing 
models of more or less equal explanatory power, it seems correct to favour the  20
simpler of the two, in this case the UE hypothesis. To summarise, the principal 
finding of this paper is that when we directly confront the two hypotheses, it is UE 
rather than NEG that dominates. On the whole NEG is rejected by UE, whereas UE 
tends not to be refuted by NEG.  
 
While they do support the underlying theory, the UE model estimates (Table 4) also 
indicate significant effects due to the variables other than employment density, a point 
emphasised in  Coombes et. al.(2004) who conclude that  high local wages are 
primarily the outcome of high-skill workers gathering in dense local labour markets, 
and that employment  density has a secondary, but significant role.  The elasticity for 
employment density (6.5%) obtained in this paper is consistent with what has been 
shown elsewhere, for instance Rosenthal and Strange (2004) indicate that the 
literature has commonly reported elasticities (for productivity) in the range of about 3-
8%. Coombes et. al.(2004)  prefer the lower bound of  their range of  about 2-6% 
depending on data and specification, and  the preferred estimates in Fingleton(2004) 
are  1.4-1.8%.  With regard to the NEG model, the fact that its empirical performance 
evidently improves as σ increases points to relatively limited interaction as a 
determinant of actual market potential, which depends increasingly on the internal 
market potential of each area as σ grows larger. This corresponds to other findings in 
the literature (e.g. Roos, 2001, Hanson, 1998, Brackman et. al., 2002), which have 
tended to show mainly localised interaction between areas.  
 
These conclusions should of course be qualified. One important caveat is that they are 
based on the analysis of comparatively small regions, whereas NEG originates from 
international trade theory, so that one might anticipate that it would be less relevant to 
understanding small-scale regional wage variations. It appears that what is important 
for wage variations among NUTS 2 regions of the EU are the links between 
competitive industry and market services providers, the increasing variety of which in 
the larger denser cities imparts increasing returns to scale with employment density.  
Wages also seem to depend on the efficiency of the labour force, plus technological 
spillover externalities, captured by measures of schooling and technical skills, plus 
national-levels effects that are picked up by country dummy variables. In this set up, 




Table 1A near here 
 
The  1 ˆ J reference distribution generated assuming that σ = 6.25 has mean equal to 
1.162 and variance equal to 0.8998, indicating that the empirical t-ratio of 6.053 in 
Table 1A would be an extreme occurrence under the NEG maintained hypothesis. We 





Table 2A near here 
 
With UE as the maintained hypothesis, and again assuming σ = 6.25 for the 
competing NEG hypothesis, the  2 ˆ J  reference distribution has a mean equal to 1.908 
and variance equal to 1.014. Since 3.912  is only exceeded in 2.803% of samples, 
using conventional significance levels this is sufficient to also falsify  H2:UE, but this 




Table 3A near here 




With UE as the maintained hypothesis and the competing NEG model estimated with 
σ =20 (Table 3A), I obtain the  2 ˆ J  reference distribution (mean =  4.595, variance = 
1.023). Since 43.14% of  2 ˆ J s exceed the t-ratio of 4.754 (Table 4A), UE is not 





With NEG as the maintained hypothesis, the Table 5A t-ratio is exceeded by 15.92% 
of  1 ˆ J s  ( mean = 4.131, variance =  0.9471). This itself provides no strong evidence to 
reject the NEG model, but as I argue above, the results are also  consistent with the 
UE hypothesis since with   σ =20 the data generated by NEG and UE are quite similar.  
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Table 1 NEG model estimates 
 
σ = 6.25  
      
Parameter
1    2sls  estimate   st.  error  t  ratio    
     
  
constant    (b0)     8.694769 0.310408   28.010746 
 log mkt.pot.(ln i P ) (b1 =1/σ)  0.429356 0.081711   5.254596 
schooling   Si (b2)   0.013898     0.001612   8.623065 




2)   0.009588 
R-squared
3    0.9399      
Correlation
2    0.9388   
Degrees of freedom    182 
Residual autocorrelation
4 (z)  -0.07368 
 
 
note:          
 
1.  The models in these Tables also include 14 national dummy variables, but these estimates are 
of limited interest and have been omitted. 
2.  The square of the Pearson product moment correlation between observed and fitted values of 
the dependent variable. 
3.  Given by Var( ˆ Y )/Var(Y), where Y is the dependent variable. 
4.  The Anselin and Kelejian (1997) test for residual correlation with endogenous variables and 
without endogenous lag, using the contiguity matrix. 
5. Defining  M as manufacturing and construction (or 'industry') and all other sectors as C 
produces fitted values that are almost identical to those given by this model, with the Pearson 




Table 2  Summary Statistics for various NEG models with 
different σ 
 










Corr(ln P,ln E) 
3.000 1.829  0.532 1.802  0.9368  0.5759 
4.900
L  3.239 1.064  1.771  0.9379  0.5991 
6.250 4.665  1.552 1.745  0.9388  0.6181 
7.600
U  6.343 2.109  1.723  0.9395  0.6385 
10.000 9.320  3.139  1.691 0.9407  0.6748 
12.000 13.188  4.218  1.665 0.9416  0.7031 
15.000 17.120  5.771  1.622 0.9431  0.7386 
20.000 21.093  8.144  1.572 0.9448  0.7686 
        
Note:  




Table 3 NEG model estimates 
 
σ = 12  
      
Parameter    2sls  estimate   st.  error  t  ratio    
     
  
constant    (b0)     9.853781     0.094554   104.213326 
 log mkt.pot.(ln i P ) (b1 =1/σ)  0.156448     0.029823   5.245808 
schooling   Si (b2)   0.012318     0.001626   7.577944 




2)   0.009147  
R-squared    0.9408       
Correlation    0.9416    
Degrees of freedom    182 





Table 4 UE model estimates 
 
        
Parameter    2sls  estimate   st.  error  t  ratio    
     
  
constant    (c0)     10.134849   0.043310  234.007942 
 emp. Density ln E (c1)  0.064766   0.009542 6.787265 
schooling   Si (c2)   0.009134   0.001738 5.253970 




2)   0.008869  
R-squared    0.9525       
Correlation    0.9434    
Degrees of freedom    182 







Table 5 NEG as maintained hypothesis   
 
σ = 12  
      
Parameter    2sls  estimate   st.  error  t  ratio    
     
  
constant    (b0)     2.904386    1.194636    2.431190 
 log market pot. i P  (b1 =1/σ)   0.077516      0.031681  2.446801 
schooling   Si (b2)   0.003317     0.002195   1.511089 
tech.know.  Ti (b3)    0.087271     0.105613    0.826327 
ˆ ln
o




2)   0.008439  
R-squared    0.9508      
Correlation    0.9464    






Table 6 UE as maintained hypothesis   
 
  
      
Parameter    2sls  estimate   st.  error  t  ratio    
     
   
constant    (c0)     2.843273      1.696956   1.675514 
 Emp. Density ln E(c1)  0.044296      0.010521   4.210097 
schooling   Si (c2)   0.000487      0.002640   0.184602 
tech.know.  Ti (c3)   -0.027238      0.117520   -0.231772 
ˆ ln
o
NEG w (c4)     0.712407       0.165745   4.298210 
 
error variance (
2 Φ )   0.008574 
R-squared     0.9573     
Correlation     0.9456  







Table 1A NEG as maintained hypothesis   
 
σ = 6.25  
      
Parameter    2sls  estimate   st.  error  t  ratio    
     
  
constant    (b0)     2.185597     1.113609  1.962625 
 log market pot. i P  (b1 =1/σ)   0.256219     0.081479   3.144585 
schooling   Si (b2)   0.004063     0.002215   1.834821 
tech.know.  Ti (b3)   0.079854     0.105149    0.759441 
ˆ ln
o
UE w (b4)     0.694377     0.114702   6.053745 
 
error variance (Ω
2)   0.008359 
R-squared    0.9508     
Correlation    0.9469   




Table 2A UE as maintained hypothesis   
 
σ = 6.25  
      
Parameter    2sls  estimate   st.  error  t  ratio    
     
   
constant    (c0)     3.539031     1.686532   2.098407 
 Emp. Density ln E(c1)  0.049477     0.010100   4.898741 
schooling   Si (c2)   0.001056     0.002672   0.395144 
tech.know.  Ti (c3)   -0.012935     0.118393   -0.109255 
ˆ ln
o
NEG w (c4)     0.643559     0.164504   3.912105 
 
error variance (
2 Φ )   0.008448 
R-squared     0.9555     
Correlation     0.9464  










Table 3A NEG model estimates 
 
σ = 20  
      
Parameter    2sls  estimate   st.  error  t  ratio    
     
  
constant    (b0)     10.224901   0.036815  277.740422  
 log mkt.pot.(ln i P ) (b1 =1/σ)  0.085096     0.013837   6.150080 
schooling   Si (b2)   0.010111     0.001687    5.995522 





2)   0.008640 
R-squared    0.9492      
Correlation    0.9448   
Degrees of freedom    182 
Residual autocorrelation (z)  0.6966 
 
 
Table 4A UE as maintained hypothesis   
 
σ = 20  
      
Parameter    2sls  estimate   st.  error  t  ratio    
     
   
constant    (c0)     3.410526     1.415081   2.410127 
 Emp. Density ln E(c1)  0.036103     0.011163   3.234032 
schooling   Si (c2)   0.001937      0.002285   0.847772
tech.know.  Ti (c3)   0.030430     0.108779   0.279741 
ˆ ln
o
NEG w (c4)     0.659625     0.138750   4.754058 
 
error variance (
2 Φ )   0.008598 
R-squared     0.9583     
Correlation     0.9454  








Table 5A NEG as maintained hypothesis   
 
σ = 20  
      
Parameter    2sls  estimate   st.  error  t  ratio    
     
  
constant    (b0)     3.600120    1.308687    2.750941 
 log market pot. i P  (a1 =1/σ)   0.041895      0.016181  2.589117 
schooling   Si (b2)   0.002958     0.002192   1.349633 
tech.know.  Ti (b1)    0.083665     0.106212    0.787720 
ˆ ln
o
UE w (b3)     0.646680     0.127698   5.064139 
 
error variance (Ω
2)   0.008532  
R-squared    0.9549      
Correlation    0.9458    
Degrees of freedom    181 
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